This paper models and tests the implications of institutional efficiency on the pattern of foreign direct investment (FDI). We posit that domestic agents have a comparative advantage over foreign agents in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions. We model these circumstances in a principal-agent framework with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante labor contract. Expost monitoring and enforcement costs are assumed to be lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for foreign ones, but foreign producers enjoy a countervailing productivity advantage. Under these asymmetries, multinationals pay higher wages than domestic producers, in line with the insight of efficiency wages and with the evidence about the 'multinationals wage premium.' FDI is also more sensitive to increases in enforcement costs.
Introduction
The large increase in FDI in recent decades has stimulated a growing empirical and theoretical literature. 1 The salient empirical regularities emerging from this literature include the finding of a hefty "multinational wage premium" -multinationals' wages exceed the wages paid by domestic producers by a significant margin, and multinationals' productivity tends to be higher than that of domestic producers. 2 The purpose of this paper is to outline and to test a model that provides an interpretation to these findings. Specifically, we identify situations where it is in multinational's self interest to pay a wage premium relative to domestic producers.
A number of previous papers have concentrated on knowledge spillovers as an argument for a multinational wage premium. Fosfuri, et al (2001) introduce a model where a multinational pays its trained workers a higher wage to induce it to resist moving to a local competitor.
Our analysis focuses instead on the role of strength in the enforcement of property rights, as measured by the domestic level of institutional efficiency, on the pattern and behavior of multinationals. Despite efforts to limit such behavior, corruption and bribery appear to be prevalent features of foreign direct investment activities. For example, Hines (1995) examines the impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 forbidding foreign bribery by American firms on subsequent FDI growth in corrupt nations originating in the United States. Hines finds that the law put US firms at a competitive disadvantage in those states as growth in FDI originating in the US in corrupt states was significantly lower than in non-corrupt states subsequent to the law's passage. A number of studies [e.g. Markusen (2001) , Wei (1997a, b) , and Smarzynska and Wei (2000) ], have posited that institutional inefficiencies such as corruption will be detrimental to both FDI and domestic investment.
The empirical evidence concerning the impact of institutional efficiency and property rights enforcement on inward investment has been mixed. Wheeler and Mody (1992) estimate a cross-country panel of manufacturing and electronics investment in which a principal component they label "Risk" includes such socio-economic factors as the Business
International indicators of corruption and bureaucratic red tape. They find no significant impact of this component on capital expenditures by U.S. multinationals. Similarly, Hines (1995) finds no measurable impact of corruption on total inward FDI in host nations after
1977.
However, more recent studies find robust evidence that corruption reduces the level of FDI entering into a country. Wei (2000) examines a panel of bilateral stocks of FDI from 12 source countries to 45 host countries and finds a large and statistically significant negative impact of corruption on inward FDI. His point estimates indicate that the increase in corruption from the level of Singapore's to that of Mexico is the equivalent of a 20
percentage point increase in the tax rate on multinationals. Similarly, Wei (1997) finds that uncertainty in corruption levels also has a measurable negative impact on inward FDI.
While these later studies establish a negative relationship between corruption and FDI, their results do not imply that FDI flows would be more sensitive to host country corruption levels than domestic investment. Domestic investment rates are also likely to respond negatively to corruption levels. However, the possibility that corruption is especially harmful to FDI, i.e. relative to its adverse impact on domestic investment, is important in terms of the general consensus that FDI plays an important role in transferring technology to developing countries. 3 We conjecture that FDI will be more sensitive to institutional inefficiencies than domestic investment. We posit that domestic entrepreneurs will have an advantage in overcoming institutional inefficiencies relative to their foreign competitors in overcoming some of the obstacles associated with corruption and weak institutions. This may be due to multitude of reasons, including better familiarity of the court system and the government, better knowledge of the key people that should be bribed and of local networks that help in resolving disputes, etc. Our model focuses on the implications of this presumption on the employment and investment patterns of domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs.
4 Specifically, we model such circumstances in a principle agent framework with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an ex-ante contract with domestic labor.
The home advantage stems from our assumption that the ex-post monitoring and 3 For example, see Barrel and Pain (1997) . However, see Aitken and Harrison (1999) for an opposing view. 4 The literature has dealt with other possible dimensions associated with home advantages and disadvantages of domestic versus foreign entrepreneurs. For example, Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1999) studied the implication of multinationals having access to cheaper cost credit and possibly inferior information about the quality of domestic projects relative to domestic entrepreneurs on the patterns of FDI. Our approach abstracts away from these issues, assuming equal financial costs for both domestic and foreign agents. This allows us to identify the implications of the home advantage associated with contract enforcement on the patterns of investment. An implication of our assumptions is that, unlike in Razin et. al. (1999) , FDI unambiguously improves the host county's welfare. enforcement cost of the labor contract is lower for domestic entrepreneurs than for foreign ones. Under these disadvantages, foreign producers require a countervailing productivity advantage to compete. Given circumstances where both multinationals and domestic producers exist side-by-side, we show that multinationals pay higher wages than domestic producers, in line with the insight of efficiency wages and with the evidence about the 'multinationals wage premium.' We also show that multinational investments are more sensitive to weakness (or more costly enforcement of) property rights.
We then directly examine the impact of institutional efficiency on the share of FDI in a host country's overall investment portfolio. In particular, we estimate the impact of an index of institutional efficiency on the ratio of average FDI flows to both gross fixed capital formation and private domestic investment over the following ten years for a cross-section of nations. We find that institutional efficiency is robustly positively correlated with the ratio of FDI to total domestic investment. This suggests that institutional inefficiency discourages FDI more severely than it does domestic investment, as predicted by our theoretical model.
We then demonstrate that this result is robust to the inclusion of a number of conditioning factors.
This paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 introduces a simple principalagent model of foreign direct investment with imperfect property rights protection. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology and data used in the paper. Section 4 reviews our results and conducts some robustness testing. Section 5 concludes.
A Simple Model of FDI with Imperfect Property Right Enforcement
In this section, we introduce a simple model of FDI with imperfect property right enforcement. We assume that there is a sector containing two firms, a multinational subsidiary and a domestic firm. Both of these firms are assumed to face a principal-agent problem vis-à-vis their laborers, with costly ex-post monitoring and enforcement of an exante contract. FDI is assumed to co-exist with domestic production, where the technological superiority of foreign subsidiaries and the relative superiority of domestic firms concerning the agency problem lead to an interior solution for the share of FDI in host-country investment.
The production functions of the domestic and foreign firms are assumed to be CobbDouglas in capital, K, and labor, L. We distinguish the foreign firm with stars. The production function of the domestic firm is assumed to satisfy
where z is the effective productivity shock, the outcome of labor's effort and the realized exogenous state of nature, ε :
Similarly, the foreign firm production function is assumed to satisfy
where satisfies
We assume that ε and * ε are independently distributed uniform on the interval
We start the analysis with the simplest benchmark by ignoring the possibility of random monitoring and random shirking. In the absence of spending monitoring and verification costs, the representative entrepreneur in the domestic and foreign sector observes only the effective productivity shocks, z and respectively. Verification of labor effort can be done only ex-post, after the realization of output. The cost of verifying labor's effort is assumed to equal proportions c and of the labor inputs, cL and respectively. Since the cost is likely to be highly correlated within a country, we assume that
Moreover, we assume that the domestic firm enjoys a low cost of verifying and enforcing effort, such that 1.
ψ > However, we assume that the foreign subsidiary enjoys a countervailing productivity advantage over its domestic counterpart, so that .
The opportunity cost of labor's time is assumed to equalω . The labor contract sets the compensation rule ex-ante. It has the following dimensions -A threshold φ of the effective productivity shock z that will trigger the costly verification and enforcement.
-In the absence of verification, or if the verification will reveal no shirking, labor would be paid . If shirking is detected, labor would be paid zero.
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We assume that the various parameters induce a separating equilibrium, where the more efficient type (a) would supply effort, and the less efficient type (b) would shirk.
In rational-expectation equilibrium, labor would prefer putting effort to shirking if the penalty for shirking exceeds the cost of effort. Under the assumptions above, this condition satisfies 6 Maximizing the penalty associated with shirking (i.e., paying zero when shirking is detected), is optimal.
This implies that the density function of effective productivity shock is z
The decision problems faced by the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs are identical.
The domestic entrepreneur sets the contract in order to maximize the expected profits V,
where the cost of capital is equal to ρ + 1 and ( ) E lc represents the expected cost per worker, which satisfies
The first term on the RHS of equation ( would always need to monitor to establish labor's type, but would only face enforcement costs when the laborer turned out to be of type b. While this is clearly a simplification, it drives none of the qualitative results. We return to this simplification in the conclusion.
Optimizing V with respect to φ , K, and L, we infer: Proof: see the appendix.
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Our results follow the logic of efficiency wages. Higher monitoring costs would induce lower incidence of monitoring and enforcement, leading the entrepreneur to pay higher wages. The net outcome is higher wage, needed to keep the penalty associated with shirking high enough despite the drop in the incidence of monitoring. A by-product of it is that investment and employment will drop.
Finally, the level of monitoring and enforcement costs will affect the relative levels of domestic and foreign investment, as noted in the following claim:
CLAIM 3: Higher enforcement costs (maintaining constant the relative cost disadvantage of the foreign producer, ψ) reduce the ratio of multinational investment to domestic investment at a rate that increases with the enforcement cost gap.
Proof:
Denoting the optimal stock of capital in the domestic firm by K , and the probability of enforcing and monitoring in the domestic industry by Q, we demonstrate in the appendix
The comparative static are simplified considerably by the observation that around the optimum
as predicted in Claim 3.
The intuition behind Claim 3 is that higher enforcement costs increase the ratio of expected enforcement costs to total worker cost, which is ( ) / cQ E lc for the domestic firm and c Q for the foreign firm. 9 The decrease in the ratio of foreign to domestic investment resulting from an increase in enforcement costs will then be proportional to the difference in the monitoring and enforcement cost ratios of domestic and foreign producers.
The observation that the enforcement cost ratio increases with the level of enforcement cost implies that the greater is the cost gap, the larger is the drop of the relative capital share induced by a given increase in the monitoring and enforcement costs, c.
(
Our model therefore predicts that multinationals characterized with higher productivity and higher cost of monitoring and enforcement will opt to pay higher wages.
Moreover, the greater is the cost of domestic enforcement c, the lower will be the ratio of foreign direct investment to domestic investment. In the following section, we test the latter empirical prediction.
Empirics
Methodology
The theoretical model above implied that foreign direct investment would constitute a smaller share of the overall investment package in countries that had inferior property rights protection. In this section, we test this theory empirically for a cross-section of countries using data on institutional efficiency.
We first estimate the following specification Since heterogeneity in government investment may add noise to the denominator in the dependent variable in our specification above, we repeat our estimation using the ratio of average inward foreign direct investment to private domestic investment, , from 1990-1999. This specification results in a smaller sample, but provides a good check of the robustness of the results we report for the larger sample.
Data
Institutional efficiency data was obtained from Mauro (1995) . The data are from Business International's index of institutional efficiency, and reflect the reports of analysts concerning the functioning of the domestic bureaucracy, with a grade of 10 indicating a "smoothly functioning, efficient bureaucracy" while a grade of 4 indicates "constant need for government approvals and frequent delays."
Remaining data, including foreign direct investment flows, gross fixed capital formation, the share of private investment in total domestic investment, and the shares of ores and metals in total exports, were obtained from the World Development Indicators.
enforcement, Q, such that the net effect is increasing .
Countries were designated as "developed" on the basis of membership in the OECD in One might expect that the developing nations would have a higher share of inward foreign direct investment. However, the data show that that is not necessarily the case. In fact, the mean ratio of foreign direct investment to gross fixed capital formation is slightly larger for the developed nations. In contrast, the mean ratio of FDI to private domestic investment is larger for the developing nations, as we might expect. Nevertheless, neither difference is statistically significant.
The simple correlations between our i
InstEff index and levels of investment relative to gross domestic product for our developing nation sample are shown in Figure 1 . It can be seen that there is a modest positive raw relationship between property rights protection and both FDI and domestic investment as measured by gross fixed capital formation. This confirms the results found in Wei (2000) . 11 We plot the simple correlation between the i InstEff index and the and ratios in Figure 2 for our developing country sample. We observe a modest positive relationship between protection of property rights protection and these ratios, as predicted by our theory. We next turn towards testing these hypotheses formally.
The full sample also displayed a modest positive relationship. However, as developed countries tend to have much lower corruption scores, we include a dummy to identify the developed nations in our parametric analysis with the full sample below.
12 Figures 1 and 2 reveal that there is a lot of clustering in the institutional efficiency ratings. In response, we also ran the regressions below with estimators robust to clustering and obtained essentially identical results, These are available from the authors on request.
Results
Base Specification
Results with as the dependent variable are shown in We then break the sample up into its developed and developing nation sub-samples and obtain similar results. For both sub-samples, the i InstEff variable enters positively and significantly for both specifications with a weighted sample, and after controlling for ores and metal exports with the un-weighted sample. There is a notable difference in the point estimates between the two sub-samples, although this difference is not statistically significant. InstEff variable of interest appear to be robust in the full sample. As was the case for the ratio to gross fixed capital formation, the 
Robustness to Inclusion of Conditioning Variables
Because we are estimating a cross-section, we obviously are precluded from using panel estimators, such as country fixed and random effects, to control for differences in country characteristics outside of our theory that may independently influence the relative share of FDI in investment. To account for other possible influences, we introduce a number of conditioning variables into our specification from the Sachs and Warner (1997) data set. 14 The conditioning variables introduced are Sub-Sahara, a dummy indicating SubSaharan African nations, Openness, an indicator of the degree to which domestic policy favors free trade, Access, a dummy indicating a nation having navigable access to the sea, Tropics, a variable measuring the share of land area subject to a tropical climate, Life, the log of life expectancy at birth measured between 1965 and 1970, and a measure of Ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The latter variable measures the probability that two randomlyselected people from a country will not belong to the same ethnic or linguistic group.
Our results for the impact of corruption on the ratio of FDI to gross fixed capital formation is shown in Table 4 . All specifications are weighted by country size. As before, we estimate the full sample with a dummy variable to indicate developed nations.
The first column introduces all of the conditioning variables simultaneously. It can be seen that the Corruption variable is insignificant after conditioning for the shares of ores and metal exports, but is significant at a ten percent confidence level with this conditioning variable.
Some exploration revealed that the Ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable displayed a high influence, and therefore the second column repeats the specification with 14 See Sachs and Warner (1997) for original data sources. this variable dropped. The Corruption variable is now positive and significant at a five percent level as before with or without conditioning for ores and metals export shares. 15 Finally, we introduce the conditioning variables one at a time. It can be seen that the significance of the Corruption variable is robust to the inclusion of any of the conditioning variables individually, either with or without conditioning for the ores and metals share.
Moreover, the point estimate for the variable coefficient is similar to that of the weighted fullsample regression above. On their own, the conditioning variables do not appear to be significant, with the exception of the influential Ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable discussed earlier. In summary, the Corruption term appears to be strongly robust to the inclusion of the conditioning variables, either for FDI as a share of gross-fixed-capital formation or for FDI as a share of private investment. The only exception was the specification that included all of the conditioning variables. When the Ethno-linguistic fractionalization variable was excluded, the Corruption variable always entered positively and significantly, as predicted. 
Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of foreign direct investment with costly enforcement of property rights. We demonstrated that when foreign direct investment suffered from a relative disadvantage in property rights protection, it economized on its physical capital investment and paid its laborers a higher wage premium. This premium induced a separating equilibrium where the relatively productive workers refrained from shirking, while the less productive workers shirked. Finally, we demonstrated that the ratio of multinational investment to domestic investment would be increasing in the security of property rights.
We then tested this prediction for a cross-section of countries using data on corruption. Our results demonstrated a robust negative relationship between the level of corruption and the ratio of FDI flows to domestic investment flows.
It should be noted that a number of our simplifying assumptions above do not drive our results. For example, our assumption of a uniform distribution for the productivity shock resulted in a widening of the tails of the distribution, where monitoring is not required to identify the worker's type. Using a more standard distribution, such as a normal, the probability space where monitoring was required would be likely to increase, and thereby increase the property rights advantage of the domestic firm in a corrupt environment.
Another simplification noted earlier was the implicit combination of monitoring and enforcement activities. While the domestic entrepreneur is likely to enjoy advantages in both of these activities, as specified above, one could imagine a situation where relative advantages in monitoring may differ by industry. Holding enforcement costs equal, we may see multinational investment relatively specialized in industries in which foreign firms enjoy relative advantages in monitoring costs. For example, multinationals may enjoy managerial advantages in some industries, which may correspond to reduced monitoring costs, but may suffer from the enforcement disadvantages alluded to above.
Finally, the wage premium result above came from the specification of property rights limitations concerning the enforcement of labor effort. However, one could easily imagine a scenario where the employment of capital also resulted in enforcement problems. In future work, we will also allow for property right limitations to arise in this dimension.
Appendix
This Appendix summarizes the derivation of the claims discussed in the paper.
Proof of Claims 1 and 2
The first order conditions corresponding to the entrepreneur's problem are:
Note that around the equilibrium
where the last equality follows from the first order condition (A1) determining the threshold in order to minimize the expected cost of employing a worker. In addition, note that
It is easy to confirm that
The comparative static of the system are determined by
It is easy to confirm that the second order conditions for maximization hold, and the determinate of the system is negative. 
Applying similar methodology, we infer that part A of proposition 1 follows from (A5) and (A4).
Applying the first order conditions (A1), and the Cobb-Douglas output specification (1), it follows that the optimal capital and labor levels, denoted by K and L , is
Note that, applying the envelope theorem,
Hence, higher enforcement costs would increase the expected cost of employing labor, reducing thereby the optimal investment, hence
Note that Claim 2 then follows directly from equation (A.6).
Proof of Claim 3
By equation (A6) if follows that
Applying (A12) to (A11) we can infer that (A13) 
